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ARTICLES
ADVISORY OPINIONS: CAUTIONS ABOUT NON-JUDICIAL
UNDERTAKINGS
Robert H. Kennedy*
We exceedingly regret every event that may cause embarrassment
to your administration, but we derive consolation from the reflec-
tion that your judgment will discern what is right, and that your
usual prudence, decision, and firmness will surmount every obsta-
cle to the preservation of the rights, peace and dignity of the
United States.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Justices of several states, unlike members of the federal judici-
ary, render advisory opinions to governors and legislatures.2 In
those states, the justices have the authority to issue requested
* Professor of Law, Florida State University; A.A., 1951, College of San Mateo; B.A.,
1956, Antioch College; LL.B., 1959, Yale University.
The author participated in In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 509 So. 2d 292 (Fla.
1987). The process, although not the merits, is discussed in this article.
1. III THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 489 (H. Johnson ed. 1891)
(letter from the Justices to President Washington, August 8, 1793, declining to provide
advice).
2. Federal prohibitions against advisory opinions result from evolution of the "cases or
controversy" limitation of article III § 2 of the United States Constitution. See Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937);
Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792). These restrictions are also derived from the
development of a series of self-regulating techniques employed by courts to circumscribe
their review authority. See infra note 21.
The doctrinal basis for federal court refusal to provide non-case advice has shifted over
time. See infra note 45. Dicta, footnotes, dissents and the power to address matters not
necessarily presented by litigants provide federal and other non-advisory judiciary with ade-
quate opportunity to express opinions about matters not directly presented by the parties.
The practice of reaching issues not directly raised by parties, however, has been strongly
criticized. See infra notes 45, 50.
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opinions in the absence of pending litigation.3 Although the prac-
tice earlier had more widespread use, it has never been employed
by all states.4 Unless carefully circumscribed, the advisory process
has considerable unexamined significance.'
Constitutional and statutory provisions differ from state to state
in regard to the circumstances which authorize requests for advice,
the governmental entities entitled to make such requests, and the
permitted scope of inquiry." Within these parameters, advisory
3. For a state's authority to issue advisory opinions, see COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 3; FLA.
CONST. art. IV, § l(c); ME. CONST. art. VI, § 3; MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 3, art. III; MICH.
CONST. art. III, § 8; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 74; R.I. CONST. art. 10, § 3; S.D. CONST. art. V, § 5;
ALA. CODE § 12-2-10 (1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 141 (1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§
1002, 1003 (West 1986) (advisory opinion available to the governor on questions related to
the death penalty). See generally Edsell, The Advisory Opinion in North Carolina, 27
N.C.L. REV. 297 (1949).
4. A. ELLINGWOOD, DEPARTMENTAL COOPERATION IN STATE GOVERNMENT (1918) (early use
of advisory opinions is described in chapter 1). Advisory practice, which predated modern
judicial review, was abandoned by Vermont, New York, Pennsylvania and Nebraska. See
Note, The Validity of the Restrictions on the Modern Advisory Opinion, 29 ME. L. REV.
300, 305-06 n.6 (1978). For many years, no state adopted a new general advisory provision
until Michigan adopted a provision in 1963. See supra note 3. This provision suggests broad
jurisdiction over "important questions of law" but, unlike other state provisions, opened
only a narrow window between the enactment and the effective date for a determination of
statutory validity.
Florida recently added separate constitutional and statutory provisions which require the
attorney general to submit proposed constitutional amendments to the supreme court for an
advisory opinion regarding compliance with that state's constitutional single-subject re-
quirement. See FLA. CONST. art. 4, § 10; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 16.061 (West 1988).
5. Current interest in a variety of non-adjudicatory alternatives to traditional litigation
suggests a reassessment of where non-case processes may appropriately be employed. See S.
GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDERS, DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1985) (survey of the varieties of
recent proposals for non-adjudicative dispute resolution).
6. The entities entitled to make a request and the matters subject to a request for advice
are: Colorado-governor or either legislative house "upon important questions upon solemn
occasions," COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 3; Florida-governor only on interpretations of state
constitutional provisions regarding his duties, FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 1(c); Maine-governor
or either house upon important questions and solemn occasions, ME. CONST. art. VI, § 3;
Massachusetts-governor or either house "upon important questions of law and. . . solemn
occasions," MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 3, art. III; Michigan-governor or either house on "im-
portant questions of law upon solemn occasions as to the constitutionality of "enacted but
not yet effective legislation," MICH. CONsT. art. III, § 8; New Hampshire-governor or either
house upon "important questions of law and upon solemn occasions," N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art.
74; Rhode Island-governor or either house on any question of law, R.I. CONST., art. 10, § 3;
South Dakota-governor "upon important question of law involved in the exercise of his
executive power and upon solemn occasion," S.D. CONST. art. V. § 5; Alabama-governor or
either legislative house may request "on important constitutional questions," ALA. CODE, §
12-2-10; Delaware-governor or either house on questions of state or federal constitution,
any enacted law, or validity of proposed constitutional amendments, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§ 141.
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opinions are employed to resolve a wide range of issues.7
At every turn, use of the advisory process involves questions of
judicial competence and function.' Where jurisdiction is exercised
to determine statutory validity, however, the process presents
rarely considered issues of judicial authority and the allocation of
responsibility among the branches of state government.9
Useful jurisprudence of advisory opinions is neither recent nor
extensive. Although there have been proponents, much of the com-
ment has been negative. The literature generally refers to the un-
certain quality and problematic use of advisory opinions as well as
the fact that the advisory process operates to disrupt the constitu-
tionally mandated separation between the branches of government.
Little analysis is found of the more general structural effect of the
advisory process or of its peculiar effect on the courts themselves. 10
7. Advisory opinions are most often employed to obtain a construction of constitutional
language, to assess the existence, allocation, or use of governmental powers (e.g., taxation
and finance, business regulation, elections and vacancies, and legislative procedures). Only
rarely are advisory opinions used in connection with the exercise of state police powers; and,
in theory, not at all to determine private property or personal rights. See Comment, Advi-
sory Opinions in Florida: An Experiment in Intergovernmental Cooperation, 24 U. FLA. L.
REv. 328, 329-30 (1972) (contains a list of subjects addressed by the Florida courts in advi-
sory opinions). For an extensive, although dated, list of subjects, see also ELLINGWOOD,
supra note 4, at 3.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 41-61.
9. Views about the use of advisory opinions to determine statutory validity will turn, in
part, on one's belief about the appropriate role of courts in the development of law. A ques-
tion to ask while reading this article is should the judiciary have an institutional role in the
supervision of other branches apart from that which is required in private litigation?
10. The advisory process has been defended and assailed on several grounds. Although
both supporters and detractors acknowledge (except for Ellingwood) that the process en-
gages the justices in intra-governmental cooperation inconsistent with the principles of sep-
aration of governmental powers, they differ on the other consequences. In general, the de-
fenders see the advisory process as a useful means to resolve intra-governmental disputes, to
correct the defaults of other departments of government, and to resolve questions of consti-
tutionality without the delays incident to ordinary adjudication. They assert that advisory
determination may avoid passage or continued enforcement of unlawful legislation and
thereby avoid injury that may occur between the adoption and eventual invalidation by
judicial review. The exercise of lawful rights and useful activity, it is argued, may be dis-
couraged by the temporary (and sometimes longterm) existence of invalid legislation.
The contrary is also argued. Useful enactments may be too quickly considered before
their merit can be demonstrated. Early commentators raised the caution regarding ordinary
judicial review. In Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20 (1793), Judge Tyler warned
that the power of review may be exercised, "[b]ut the violation must be plain and clear, or
there might be danger of the judiciary preventing the operation of laws which might be
productive of much public good." Id. at 61, quoted in 11 HOWARD, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA 695 (1974).
The detractors note that other adequate mechanisms exist for early determination of im-
portant matters; such advice may effect a harmful form of prior restraint on legislation and
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In some jurisdictions, advisory opinions have been used to ob-
tain accelerated consideration of the constitutional validity of pro-
posed or enacted statutes. This use of the advisory opinion appears
to enable state justices to supervise the legislative branch, yet re-
main themselves controlled by the executive. It is argued here that
the process, unless subject to judicial control, may tend to reduce
the governmental authority of both the legislative and the judicial
departments.
A 1987 Florida advisory proceeding suggests that advisory opin-
ions have the potential to hazard substantive error, to effect a re-
distribution of governmental authority, and to damage a court.
II. THE 1987 FLORIDA SERVICES TAX EVENT
The recent controversy arose in Florida concerning the state
budget. Florida's constitution prohibits the imposition of a per-
sonal income tax." Thus, funding is largely dependent upon a sales
tax which has historically exempted most services.'2 In early 1987,
the Florida legislature, with the urging of a new governor, enacted
chapter 87-6 of the Florida Statutes to be effective on July 1, 1987.
The Act repealed most tax exemptions for personal and other ser-
vices. 13 There was immediate and apparently unexpected strong
opposition. Lawsuits were filed challenging the statute as violating
both the state and federal constitutions. 4
is more likely than an adjudicated decision to be in error. Early advisory determination of
unconstitutionality may restrain the enforcement of useful legislation that would, if re-
viewed in the light of its actual operation, be found valid. See generally ELLINGWOOD, supra
note 4, at 3 (an early study which contains a useful history); Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence
of Article III: Perspectives on the "Case or Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REv.
297 (1979); Carberry, The State Advisory Opinion in Perspective, 44 FOEDHAM L. Rav. 81
(1975); Field, The Advisory Opinion-An Analysis, 24 IND. L.J. 203 (1949); Frankfurter, A
Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1002 (1924) (response to Hudson); Hudson,
Advisory Opinions of National and International Courts, 37 HARv. L. Rav. 970 (1924) (af-
firmative views); Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE
L.J. 1363 (1973); Spann, Expository Justice, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 585 (1983); Stevens, Advi-
sory Opinions-Present Status and an Evaluation, 34 WASH. L. REv. 1 (1959); Note, Advi-
sory Opinions on the Constitutionality of Statute, 69 HARv. L. REv. 1302 (1956); Note, The
Validity of the Restrictions on the Modern Advisory Opinion, 29 Ma. L. REv. 305 (1978);
Comment, Advisory Opinions in Florida: An Experiment in Intergovernmental Coopera-
tion, 24 U. FLA. L. Rav. 328 (1971).
11. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 5.
12. Approximately 67% of Florida's revenue is generated by sales tax receipts, 9% from
corporate income tax, and 6% from beverage tax. THE FLORDA HANDBOOK 140 (Peninsular
Publishing Co. 1987-88).
13. See FLA. STAT. ANN. tit. XIV (West Supp. 1988).
14. The lawsuits, according to Florida procedure, were filed in the Second Judicial Cir-
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The Governor, citing pending and threatened lawsuits and a re-
sulting budgetary shortfall if the Act should be found unconstitu-
tional, requested an advisory opinion from the justices of the Su-
preme Court of Florida.15 The court accepted jurisdiction and the
pending lower court cases were stayed.16 The justices found the
statute constitutional, but political opposition to the tax contin-
ued.17 The Governor called for repeal, which was accomplished at a
special legislative session in December, 1987.18 The Florida "ser-
vices tax" was in force for six months.
This brief Florida engagement provides a lesson for other courts
and governmental entities employing or considering the employ-
ment of advisory opinions."
cuit Court for Leon County, Florida against the Department of Revenue (DOR) and/or Ger-
ald Lewis, Comptroller of the State of Florida, and/or Randy Miller, Executive Director of
the Florida Department of Revenue, and/or Bob Martinez, the Governor. The Plaintiffs in-
cluded: Air Transport Association of America, United Parcel Service Co., The Royale
Group, Ltd., Fiserv, Inc., North American Financial Services, Ltd., Association of National
Advertisers, Inc., American Advertising Federation, Inc., Tribune Company, and the Florida
Association of Broadcasters, Inc. They were consolidated before then Circuit Judge Charles
E. Miner. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 509 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 1987).
15. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 509 So. 2d 292, 297 (Fla. 1987).
16. On May 15, 1987, the pending trial court cases before Judge Miner in the Leon
County Circuit Court were stayed at the request of the Department of Revenue by "indefi-
nite extension" until after the justices of the Florida Supreme Court could render advice to
the governor.
17. The Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction by Interlocutory Order No. 70,533
(May 13, 1987). The Order also established a briefing schedule. A full day of argument was
scheduled on June 22, 1987. A substantial number of additional entities and persons
presented written and/or oral argument before the Florida Supreme Court on that date in-
cluding: Florida Criminal Defense Lawyers, the Tax Section of the Florida Bar, the Florida
Bar, Magazine Publishers Association, Association of Business Publishers, Florida Associa-
tion of General Contractors Council, the Florida Motion Picture and Television Association,
Inc., Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., CBS, Inc., NBC, Inc., and North American Financial
Services.
At a September 18, 1987 consolidated status conference, Judge Miner orally announced
his intention to hear no argument in the trial court cases on matters (by then) resolved by
the Florida Supreme Court's advisory opinion.
18. FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 87, § 548 (West 1987).
19. The more detailed political and textual circumstances of the 1987 matter and the
Florida court's revisionist acceptance of jurisdiction included groundwork laid by the Flor-
ida legislature in 1986; expanding the state tax base and "sunsetting" tax exemptions for the
sale of services scheduled to expire with the 1987 legislative session. Chapter 87-6 of the
Florida Statutes was enacted to be effective on July 1, 1987 and imposed a tax on almost all
services. Strong and organized opposition to the enactment came from national advertisers,
the Florida Bar, building contractors and others. In response to lawsuits filed challenging
the statute under the state and federal constitutions, the governor requested constitutional
advice from the Florida Supreme Court. Executive power to make such a request, and the
court's jurisdiction to respond, were asserted to exist pursuant to the Florida Constitution
which states that "[tihe governor may request in writing the opinion of the justices of the
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:173
Judicial authority is enlarged when courts are granted or assume
power to reach binding decisions regarding the validity of the acts
of other governmental branches. Thus, the authority to provide ad-
visory opinions regarding the validity of acts of the legislature
might also seem to broaden judicial authority.20 However, as advi-
sory opinions originate in a request by another branch of govern-
ment and operate on quite different premises, judicial authority
may in fact be lessened. Authority will be retained only if the court
has reserved principled discretion to determine when to respond to
a request and when to decline.2' When the executive branch is
given authority to request opinions regarding statutory validity,
supreme court as to the interpretation of any portion of this constitution upon any question
affecting his executive powers and duties." FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 1(c).
It was widely assumed that the governor's request was made to pre-empt a trial court
finding of unconstitutionality which could be followed by an injunction against enforcement.
The justices, with two dissents, immediately accepted jurisdiction. After extensive briefing
and argument by opponents and proponents, a majority of the justices found the Act valid
under the state constitution in all but one minor provision. In re Advisory Opinion to the
Governor, 509 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 1987).
The Florida justices acknowledged, but did not identify, limitations on their advisory ju-
risdiction. Id. at 301. ("[The constitution] does not generally empower this court to issue
advisory opinions concerning the validity of statutes . . . ."). They relied on the constitu-
tional text to decline the federal issues presented. Id. at 302. The justices found jurisdiction
to consider the particular statute because it implicated the constitutional obligations of the
governor. Id.
Jurisdiction to provide non-case advice regarding statutory validity had earlier been re-
sisted in a series of Florida opinions construing the same enabling language. See infra note
28. The doctrine that power to consider a request addressing statutory validity could be
exercised when the statute implicated the governor's constitutional duties had earlier been
expressly rejected by that court. In re Opinion of Justices, 54 Fla. 136, 44 So. 756 (1907).
20. Insofar as advisory opinions are resolved on hypothetical facts, there is a separate
sense in which the court's power can be considered enlarged. A court that can ground a
decision on a factual matrix of its own construction is an unfettered court. The intentional
creation of facts for use in arriving at a predetermined result would, of course, be a parody
of the judicial process.
21. While no common law jurisdiction permits courts to initiate a constitutional inquiry
or statutory interpretation, the authority to construe statutes and to test legislation against
constitutional standards, as part of rights adjudication, is well established. To avoid con-
stant and eventually self-destructive judicial intrusion, courts have developed a set of self-
limiting doctrines of judicial restraint. The "cases or controversies" language of article MI of
the United States Constitution has been construed to mean that the federal courts may
intervene only when such matters are presented in a form capable of judicial resolution-an
adversarial context between contesting litigants. See, e.g., United States v. Freuhauf, 365
U.S. 146 (1961). Other prudential doctrines of justiciability and appropriateness include
those of "mootness." See, e.g., Hall v. Beals, 369 U.S. 45 (1969). In Hall, the challenged
statute had been amended to meet the stated objections and the Court's per curiam opinion
noted that, "[tihe case has therefore lost its character as a present, live controversy of the
kind that must exist if we are to avoid advisory opinions on abstract propositions of law."
Id. at 48. See generally HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
107-294 (1988).
ADVISORY OPINIONS
governmental power shifts from the legislature to the executive
branch. Governmental power will then flow away from the judicial
branch if it has not developed legal principles upon which to de-
cline participation.2 2
The power to assess the constitutional validity of enacted stat-
utes differs from ordinary judicial power. It permits a court to ex-
ercise authority over almost the full range of governmental func-
tions.2 3 Because this authority presents long-term hazards to a
balanced governmental system and to the judiciary itself, it is nor-
neally subject to a set of familiar structural controls of the judicial
agenda including, inter alia, the inability of courts to initiate any
inquiry and the powerlessness of any persons, including govern-
mental entities, to seek a court's intervention where concrete rights
are not in dispute.2 4
The characteristic agenda of an advisory opinion is different
from that of a rights dispute: it is political rather than adjudica-
tory. Initiation of an advisory proceeding is not by a rights-litigant
but, instead, by another branch of the government. The decision to
accept or decline engagement is different from the decision to ac-
cept or decline engagement at a litigant's behest.
Where useful parameters of advisory intervention are not found
in the enabling language or are ignored, and where court-made
standards of discretion to limit the availability of advisory opin-
22. Providing advice regarding proposed legislation has somewhat different conse-
quences. A Court which provides such advice to the executive alters the balance of power
only to the extent the legislature accepts the justices' adverse advice and amends the legisla-
tion or decides against its enactment.
23. The power was initially announced for the federal system by Justice Marshall in
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). However, it had been claimed earlier at
the state level. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) 5 (1782).
24. Once litigation is initiated, courts are not powerless to control the questions for reso-
lution. Courts often decline to address issues the parties wish to have resolved. Moreover,
they sometimes reach out for issues not presented by litigants. The latter power, in some
ways parallel to the advisory process, has been challenged as potentially damaging not only
to stare decisis but to the courts as institutions. A recent example is Justice Stevens' dissent
from the Court's sui sponte calendar restoration for reconsideration of a matter neither
presented by the litigants nor raised in the record, i.e., the earlier holding that 42 U.S.C. §
1981 prohibits private racial discrimination:
If the Court decides to cast itself adrift from the constraints imposed by the adver-
sary process and to fashion its own agenda, the consequences for the Nation-and for
this Court as an institution-will be even more serious than any temporary encour-
agement of previously rejected forms of racial discrimination. The Court has inflicted
a serious-and unwise-wound upon itself today.
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 108 S. Ct. 1419, 1423 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1989]
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ions are not employed, a court may find itself without political
control of its own advice. The court may find itself participating in
a realignment of governmental power by being compelled by the
executive branch to review the work of the legislative branch.
Thus, the court may properly be charged with invited subservi-
ence. Where the use of advisory opinions may serve to realign gov-
ernmental powers or damage a court, attention should be directed
to the consequences of accepting engagement.25
In Florida, unlike other advisory states, only the governor has
authority to ask the high court for an advisory opinion.2" That lim-
itation on requesting authority only highlights the issue discussed
here. What makes a critical difference is whether the scope of the
constitutional authority includes the right to obtain an opinion re-
garding statutory validity.27 If so, then it becomes uniquely impor-
tant that the justices retain the moral and institutional authority
to decline an executive request.
In the Florida matter, there appeared to be a surprising display
of indifference to the state's limiting constitutional language and
history, and to principles upon which judicial discretion may be
and had previously been exercised.28 Although denying such intent,
25. Like other advisory states, Florida has a provision for separation of governmental
powers. See infra note 62.
26. See supra note 6.
27. The Florida governor's authority to seek an opinion regarding statutory validity
would appear to be denied by both the history and language of article IV, § 1(c) of the
Florida Constitution. By way of background, an advisory provision first appeared in 1868 as
article V, § 16 of the Florida Constitution. The range of advisory subject matter was both
unlimited and a response was arguably mandatory: "[T]he Governor may at any time re-
quire the opinion of the justices of the [s]upreme [c]ourt as to the interpretation of any
portion of this Constitution, or upon any point of law. . . ." FLA. CONsT. art. V, § 16 (1868,
amended 1875) (emphasis added). That broad executive power was withdrawn by an
amendment in 1875. Since 1875, the operative language has limited inquiry "to the interpre-
tation of any portion of this Constitution upon any question affecting his Executive powers
and duties." (1885, amended 1968) (emphasis added). This language was adopted as article
IV, § 13 of the 1885 constitution and is now found in the current constitution as article IV, §
1(c). The constitutional provision adopted in 1968, while retaining the limiting 1875 juris-
dictional language, deleted language that could have been read to mandate a judicial re-
sponse. It also provided for participation by interested parties. Language seeming to require
a response ("the Governor may at any time require the opinion") was replaced by discre-
tionary language ("the governor may request"). See FLA. CONsT. art. IV, § 1(c).
28. Historically, the Florida justices had almost always declined to respond to requests
for opinions regarding statutory validity. See, e.g., In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor,
103 Fla. 668, -, 137 So. 881, 882 (1931) ("The Justices are not authorized to render an
opinion to the Governor as to the validity of a statute."); In re Advisory Opinion, 64 Fla. 1,
-, 59 So. 778, 782 (1912) ("The authority of the Justices of the supreme court under this
section . . . is confined to the interpretation of some portion of the Constitution upon a
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the Florida court seems to have issued an open invitation to the
state's executive branch to consult the court on the constitutional
validity of any enactment.29 The justices, by default and with a
cooperative legislature not itself properly advised of the conse-
quences, 0 appear to have agreed that the executive branch may
avoid the delay and uncertainties of ordinary rights adjudication
by calling upon the justices preemptively to supervise the work of
the legislature. Thus, any potential benefits of the advisory process
must be weighed against the structural costs of more frequent,
non-litigated and largely unexplained constitutional intrusion by a
judicial branch limited only by the self-restraint of the executive.
Exceptional circumstances arise whenever a court agrees, in the
absence of adjudication, to resolve matters of constitutional impor-
tance. Questions of executive or legislative power to require such
an assessment, of judicial power to decline to respond, and of judi-
cial accountability for the exercise of such non-judicial power lie at
the heart of the matter.
question affecting the Governor's executive powers and duties, and does not authorize an
opinion upon a question affecting the executive powers.., that may be authorized by a
valid statute .... [T]he Justices ... are not authorized to render.., an opinion upon
statutory enactments that affect his executive powers and duties."); In re Opinion of Judges,
62 Fla. 446, _ 57 So. 345, 345 (1912) ("It is uniformly held under previous opinions...
[that the judges] are not authorized ... to give an opinion upon the constitutionality of
statutes affecting the Governor's executive powers and duties."); Advisory Opinion to Gov-
ernor, 50 Fla. 169, -, 39 So. 187, 187 (1905) ("Reduced to its last analysis, the purpose of
your letter is not to have us construe any clause of the Constitution affecting your executive
powers and duties, but to have us pass upon the constitutionality of an act of the Legisla-
ture."). The rule was applied, interalia, in 1957 and in 1959 to decline invitations to opine
regarding statutory validity. See In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 113 So. 2d 703
(Fla. 1959); Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 96 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 1957).
There were earlier expressions of a willingness to exercise a broader jurisdiction where
new language of the 1968 Constitution, was seen as creating an opportunity to exercise a
more broad participation. See, e.g., In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 374 So. 2d 959
(Fla. 1979). For example, in a concurring opinion, Justice Overton wrote that a limitation on
jurisdiction "reflects the former view of this Court existing before the 1968 Constitutional
change." Id. at 969 (Overton, J., concurring). However, there has been no explanation of
how the language added in 1968 could be read to enlarge the justices' authority.
29. As indicated in note 19, the majority of the Florida Supreme Court in 1987 asserted
a broad doctrine that state statutes become subject to advisory assessment when they impli-
cate the executive's constitutional responsibilities. This means any act of the legislature may
be subjected to advisory consideration. Florida's Justice Barkett made the above point when
she declined to participate in the 1987 matter. Writing separately, Justice Barkett noted
that the new majority analysis allowed the justices to "advise the governor concerning the
validity of any statute, without limitation, because every statute potentially affects the gov-
ernor's duty to faithfully execute the laws." In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 509 So.
2d 292, 319 (Fla. 1987) (Barkett, J., declining to join in opinion).
30. In 1987, the Florida legislature had its counsel urge the Florida Supreme Court to
recognize executive authority to seek an assessment of the legislature's work. Brief for the
Legislature at 65, In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 509 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 1987).
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Judges tend to assume that they need not repeatedly justify
what they do in the context of adjudication. That is the accepted
work of judges. However, providing non-case advice at the request
of another branch of government is different, and the need to ex-
plain such a practice should be more plainly felt by the judges in-
volved. This is more than a matter of general civic duty; rather, it
is an obligation owed to future judges who will be bound by stare
decisis to follow the court's jurisdictional decisions. 1 Further, it is
an obligation owed to other branches which may wish in the future
to obtain the judges' views. The need for articulation of the pur-
pose and the standards is especially important where, as in Flor-
ida, the propriety of an advisory request can no longer be deter-
mined by parsing the enabling language, by tracking constitutional
history, or by analysis of the case law.
Over the years, courts have appeared perplexed, and often some-
what embarrassed, in explaining the scope of their advisory juris-
diction.32 Often, no explanation has been provided. The scope of
the Florida court's advisory jurisdiction, for example, seems to
have depended more on the composition of the bench than on any
developed governmental or judicial policy."3
31. Whatever the character of advisory opinions themselves, the court's decision to ac-
cept or to decline jurisdiction is a decision which turns on interpretation of the enabling
language. That institutional decision is entitled to stare decisis. Equally, the decision to
accept or to deny all or any part of a particular request is entitled to precedential
recognition.
32. The justices have been particularly unclear in discussing the range of subjects over
which they could exercise discretion to provide advice. In any government of divided au-
thority, discretion to act may be exercised only within the boundaries of power allocated by
constitution or statute; it cannot legitimately be exercised beyond those parameters. A com-
parable situation is presented by the jurisdictional boundaries imposed on federal courts by
article III of the United States Constitution and congressional grants of authority. While
those courts exercise a degree of discretion within these limits, legitimate discretion cannot
be exercised to reach subject matter beyond them.
This limit has been expressed in the federal system since Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S.
(5 Cranch) 303 (1809), where Chief Justice Marshall, in agreeing that jurisdiction was lack-
ing stated: "Turn to the article of the constitution of the United States, for the statute
cannot extend the jurisdiction beyond the limits of the constitution." Id. at 304. That a
range of judicial discretion has been exercised at least to avoid adjudication of matters oth-
erwise within granted power is clear from, for example, the judge-made doctrine of absten-
tion. See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983);
Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82 (1970); Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S.
496 (1941).
33. There has been, in Justice Frankfurter's words, no evidence of any "continuity of
intellectual criteria and procedures" to address a continuing problem. Burford v. Sun Oil
Co., 319 U.S. 315, 336 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). For example, the authority to
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The exercise of judicial restraint and retention of judicial discre-
tion requires development and articulation of limiting standards
based on general principles of government. Whatever compulsion
there is for courts to respond to the request of a coordinate branch
for constitutional advice, it is now largely self-imposed. 4 Without
standards with which to address a request for advice, courts will be
unable to explain, in a principled manner, any engagement or re-
assess the validity of statutes at the governor's request was withdrawn from the Florida
court as early as 1875 and has not been restored. See supra note 27. The court thereafter
usually responded to such requests by denying that it had such authority. See supra note
28. However, in 1987 the court, without explanation, responded affirmatively to the gover-
nor's request to assess statutory constitutionality. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor,
509 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 1987). Again, that court has been historically uncertain whether its
authority to respond could turn on expressions of urgent political need. As early as 1942 the
Florida Supreme Court had resisted enlargement of its advisory jurisdiction by stating that
"emergencies do not create [judicial] power or authority." See In re Advisory Opinion to the
Governor, 151 Fla. 44, - 9 So. 2d 172, 176 (Fla. 1942). In the 1987 matter, however, the
court found jurisdiction arising from "the potentially chaotic impact upon your constitu-
tional duties . . . which could be caused by finding Chapter 87-6 invalid." In re Advisory
Opinion to the Governor, 509 So. 2d 292, 301 (Fla. 1987). There have been earlier examples
of the need-based approach. E.g., In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 243 So. 2d 573
(Fla. 1971); In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 239 So. 2d 1, 8-9 (Fla. 1970) ("[I]n view
of the great public interest in maintaining the fiscal stability of state government, we have
decided to answer your request"). The line of demarcation might have once appeared to be
fiscal. However, it was not. In In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 374 So. 2d 959 (Fla.
1979), the question related not to state finances, but to judicial vacancies. The court found
it had jurisdiction "[i]n light of the irreparable harm to the public that might result from an
erroneous implementation of this statute." Id. at 962.
34. In most jurisdictions, high court justices are not bound by the enabling language to
respond to every advisory request. For example, Florida's constitution no longer imposes
any such obligation. See supra note 27. In some states, the language still suggests a
mandatory duty to respond. Massachusetts' constitution provides that the legislature "shall
have authority to require" advisory opinions, but recognizes a "duty" to respond that is not
absolute. See, e.g., Opinion of Justices to Senate, 383 Mass. 895, 424 N.E.2d 1092 (1981);
Answer of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 373 Mass. 898, 367 N.E.2d 793
(1977). In New Hampshire, the governor has "authority to require" advisory opinions, but
the court has limited its opinions nonetheless. See, e.g., In re Opinion of the Justices, 88
N.H. 484, 190 A. 425 (1937); In re Opinion of the Justices, 75 N.H. 613, 72 A. 754 (1909).
The Delaware court suggests it is bound to respond. See, e.g., In re Opinions of the Justices,
47 Del. 117, 88 A.2d 128 (1952). The provision is, however, to be narrowly construed. See,
e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 413 A.2d 1245 (Del. 1980); Opinion of the Justices, 382 A.2d
1364 (Del. 1978). Maine interprets the language "justices shall be obliged" as limiting opin-
ions. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 460 A.2d 1341 (Me. 1982); Opinion of the Justices,
339 A.2d 483 (Me. 1975). The Rhode Island court has recognized an obligation to respond.
See Opinion to the Governor, 93 R.I. 262, 174 A.2d 553 (1969). It will, however, strictly
construe the enabling language. See Advisory Opinion to the Senate, 108 R.I. 551, 277 A.2d
750 (1971).
A construction retaining discretion is probably always available. An account of the man-
ner in which the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine has retained its discretion to determine
its advisory jurisdiction, despite apparently mandatory language is found in Note, The Va-
lidity of the Restrictions on the Modern Advisory Opinion, 29 ME. L. REv. 305 (1978).
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fusal of engagement. A court which is unable to explain either its
engagement or its refusal to become engaged on principle must ac-
cept or decline randomly or on what will appear to be plainly polit-
ical grounds. 5
III. THE THRESHOLD JURISDICTIONAL QUESTION
Given a constitutional or statutory authority to participate, the
threshold issue for any advisory court will be whether the judges
ought to accept an invitation to provide counsel to another branch.
That decision-to become engaged or to decline-is the most im-
portant decision for the governmental system. This decision is
quite different in its implications from any substantive advice the
justices may ultimately provide. Thus, in the Florida example, the
significant governmental issue for the Florida justices was not the
constitutionality of a statute, but rather the proper scope of the
Florida Supreme Court's advisory jurisdiction. The Florida su-
preme court was asked to define the appropriate relationship
among the branches of state government. Nothing, however, sug-
gests the matter was addressed.
Resolution of the jurisdictional issues surrounding advisory
opinions is undertaken with less reliable information and with even
less analysis than resolution of the substantive questions presented
by a request for advice. As is discussed below, an advisory opinion
carries an unacceptable risk of substantive decisional error. Still,
those substantive issues are addressed with better information
than is the question whether or not to respond at all. While many
states provide for outside participation on the substantive issues
presented, 6 no state provides any means for the public to address
35. A court with no adequate standards with which to decline would have to make the
choice at random, or on a political basis. Alternatively, the court could choose to review all
proposals. In that case, a wholly different set of governmental relationships would emerge.
The justices would become a general committee of review-a structure that was rejected at
the federal level at the Philadelphia convention. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 52
(1971) ("IT]his vital responsibility [to determine constitutionality] does not amount to an
unlimited power to survey the statute books and pass judgment on laws before the courts
are called upon to enforce them.").
36. The Florida provision is illustrative: "The justices shall, subject to their rules of pro-
cedure, permit interested persons to be heard on the questions presented." FLA. CONST. art.
IV, § 1(c). Entitled to be heard only "on the questions presented," interested persons in
Florida have no access to comment on the jurisdictional question. In the recent Florida
matter, the court, after accepting jurisdiction and agreeing to provide its views, invited "in-
terested persons" to incorporate comments on the court's jurisdiction into their briefs on
the merits. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 509 So. 2d 292, 300 (Fla. 1987).
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the jurisdictional question.3 7 Outside participation is possible only
after a matter has been accepted for resolution. The ex parte deci-
sion is more than private intra-governmental advice; it is an insti-
tutional response which has a greater probable life and larger
structural importance than any substantive opinion the justices
may subsequently issue.
There is often little permanence to actual advisory opinions as
the process is typically enmeshed in transitory events. The issues
presented, typically political, often lack substance and the results
are likely to be highly perishable.38 The structural implications of
participation, however, are of a different order of permanence.
Courts acknowledge the transitory nature of advisory opinions
when they point to their precedential thinness; they are expressly
said to be "non-judicial," "non-final" and "non-binding. ' 3e
Whatever the truth of those assertions, the threshold jurisdictional
decision is final, binding and potentially very important. In the re-
cent Florida example, a change in the political circumstances that
prompted the governor's request soon made the justices' opinion
entirely irrelevant, but the court's unintended realignment of gov-
ernmental roles persists.
Receipt of an invitation to give private advice gives any high
court a potent and generally ignored opportunity to shore up its
own authority and to reinforce constitutionally mandated separa-
tion of governmental powers. The choice for the court is between
37. The jurisdiction question is made ex parte. There is no provision for other than
judicial participation in deciding the matter with only the governmental request in hand.
The 1987 Florida Supreme Court, for example, took jurisdiction the day following the gover-
nor's request. The failure or inability of courts to inquire into the circumstances described
as needful by another governmental branch may be explained on the theory that the more
immediate political entities are better able to determine the need for advice. They are, how-
ever, not better positioned (nor perhaps equally obligated) to protect the balance of allo-
cated governmental powers.
38. The Florida "services tax" was front-page news for six months until repeal. It was
the subject of special legislative sessions. No mention seems to have been made, politically
or journalistically, of the justices' advisory opinion. The press, the governor, and the legisla-
tors simply ignored the court's views.
39. The recent Florida opinion uses typical language: "[A]dvisory opinions are merely
legal opinions of the individual justices, offered for the Governor's guidance in the perform-
ance of his or her constitutional duties. The opinions expressed. . . do not constitute deci-
sions of the Florida Supreme Court and, therefore, are not binding in any future judicial
proceedings." In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 509 So. 2d 292, 315 (Fla. 1987). The
point was reiterated in closing the opinion with the statement: "We emphasize that an advi-
sory opinion is for the benefit of the chief executive and, therefore, does not carry with it
the mandate of the Court." Id.
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early advisory intervention and awaiting adjudication. Potential
damage to the governmental structure through advisory interven-
tion might be an acceptable cost if there was good evidence of ne-
cessity, but that is rarely the case.4" Further, the justices rarely
attempt to explain why the exercise of advisory jurisdiction is
likely to result in a more useful governmental product than what
might be expected from adjudication. When judges cannot explain
why the net benefits of advisory participation are likely to exceed
the benefits of awaiting ordinary processes, they should recognize
the institutional costs and decline to give advice. This comparative
analysis, present in every such jurisdictional resolution and depen-
dent upon the design and application of standards for decision,
seems usually to be ignored or left unstated.
Hence, the two most persistent criticisms of the advisory process
are related: (1) advisory opinions are too poorly informed to be re-
liable and; (2) engaging in the advisory process adversely affects
both the courts and the formal structure of government.
IV. THE POORLY EDUCATED COURT AND ITS POTENTIAL FOR
ERROR
A longstanding criticism of advisory opinions is that they do not
promote much confidence.41 Underlying this criticism is the belief
that our confidence in a particular result is warranted in propor-
tion to the degree the tribunal was informed. Appearing to be
without "real" facts and abstract, advisory opinions are thought to
be more erroneous than record-based adjudicated opinions.42
There are circumstances where an opinion may relate to something
called "pure law," in which record facts and sometimes advisory
courts may be dispensed.43 Advisory courts sometimes justify their
40. A review of the decided matters suggests that there has rarely been compelling rea-
son to proceed. Virtually without exception, the matter could have been presented con-
cretely in an adjudicatory context with only slight delay.
41. This is probably the lesser of the two basic criticisms. After all, courts make mis-
takes, and there is always, at least in theory, another day.
42. Others have noted that a further difference lies in the care with which such matters
may be addressed. A court's potential for error probably increases as the recognized impor-
tance of what it is about diminishes. Where, as in advisory opinions, the concrete interests
of identified persons are not obviously affected, the inclination to exercise care and delibera-
tion may be lessened.
43. Some plain legal questions may be answered confidently without factual develop-
ment. An example would be whether or not a complaint affirmatively demonstrated expira-
tion of a statute of limitations. In the advisory context, examples may include construction
of an ambiguous constitutional term. E.g., In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 243 So.
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summary constitutional intervention by asserting that questions of,
for example, "facial" validity, unlike questions of "applied" valid-
ity, are pure law questions."" Yet, the matter of decisional incom-
petence resulting from a lack of traditional judicial information
should be more worrisome to courts than is generally asserted.4" If
damage to the governmental system is the price of such abstract
judicial undertaking, even invitations to decide matters of pure law
cannot be accepted with impunity; the confidence one may have in
the resulting advisory opinion is irrelevant to the damage to the
governmental system. This observation is true in all matters but is
especially the case where preemptive jurisdiction is exercised to as-
sess the constitutional validity of new statutes.
2d 573 (Fla. 1971) (Does a provision precluding imposition of an income tax on a "citizen or
resident" preclude a corporate income tax?); In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 225
So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1969) (Is the position of Secretary of Administration an office within the
purview of the constitution?). Questions of the constitutional validity of statutes are never
so easy because it is uncommon that a legislature will enact a patently unconstitutional
statute. But see Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402 (1941). ("It is of course conceivable that
a statute might be flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in
every clause, sentence and paragraph, and in whatever manner and against whomever an
effort might be made to apply it.").
44. Proponents of the advisory process have argued that where matters of "facial" valid-
ity or pure textual construction are presented, the advisory process does not much differ
from declaratory judgments or other forms of summary procedure. Briefs of Counsel, In re
Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 509 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 1987). Summary adjudication is,
however, quite different in the resources available to a tribunal. All summary processes re-
quire the participation of, and are controlled by, interested parties. Summary processes nor-
mally deal with historic events rather than with hypothetical future events. Rights-inter-
ested parties are present to assert the inappropriateness of proceeding in a summary fashion
and those parties can warn a court if summary disposition is unwarranted. A factual and
legal record can be made, and therefore, if summary disposition is unwarranted, the matter
can be further adjudicated. If a court persists in error, appeal lies from the error based on
that record.
45. Professor Tribe has indicated that, while early federal refusals to issue advisory
opinions referenced article III of the United States Constitution and were stated in terms of
the need to maintain a separation of governmental powers, more recent refusals tend to
address problems of judicial function and competence-issues equally as relevant to state as
to federal courts. L. TRIBE, AmmrixcAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 57 (1978); see also Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 108 S. Ct. 1419, 1422-23 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting from the
Court's sua sponte calendar restoration of an issue not presented by the litigants). Justice
Frankfurter's language in United States v. Freuhauf, 365 U.S. 146 (1961) states:
Such opinions, such advance expressions of legal judgment upon issues which remain
unfocused because they are not pressed before the Court with that clear concreteness
provided when a question emerges precisely framed and necessary for decision from a
clash of adversary argument exploring every aspect of a multi-faceted situation em-
bracing conflicting and demanding interests, we have consistently refused to give.
Id. at 157.
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In addressing every matter involving statutory validity, "facial"
or "applied," adjudicatory or advisory, a court grounds its decision
on fact.46 In every such matter, an advisory court is likely to know
less about the facts than an adjudicatory court. Decisions about
facial validity are rendered on hypothetical facts, generally un-
stated, and always prospective. In contrast, judicial review of oper-
ative statutes typically employs "real" facts, record-stated and ret-
rospective. In assessing the potential for error, courts should
consider the origins of the issues they address47 and the difference
in the nature and quality of the facts they employ.48 Courts should
46. Assessing "facial" constitutionality and assessing "applied" constitutionality do not
differ in that the former is an analysis of law alone and the latter is an analysis of law and
fact, which requires a record. Both results turn on facts. The operative facts may be con-
tained in a record, or they may be assumed. They may be agreed upon, or entirely hypothet-
ical. The operative facts may be true or false, but they are there, and they drive the result.
The distinctive and troublesome feature of "facial" determinations, including those arising
in an advisory context, is the source and quality of the facts employed.
47. While the decision to provide an advisory opinion, like the legislative decision to
proceed, requires a legal and factual analysis, courts seem to accept advisory inquiries as a
matter of intra-governmental comity and accept the ex parte assertions of the requesting
governmental entity. While it can be argued that the more political branches are better
positioned to recognize the need for advisory intervention, those branches often have inter-
ests quite different from those of the judiciary. For example, the obligation to preserve both
a separation of powers and judicial independence is not as directly imposed on the other
branches. In Florida, as elsewhere, the judicial branch has acknowledged its special obliga-
tion to preserve a separation of governmental powers. See, e.g., Pepper v. Pepper, 66 So. 2d
280 (Fla. 1953).
48. The recent Florida opinion shows a court assuming non-record facts and using them
to make judicial projections about the future operation of that statute. In re Advisory Opin-
ion to the Governor, 509 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 1987). For example, in rejecting the argument that
taxation of legal services would limit access to counsel, the justices asserted that:
The instant tax does not appear to have such an effect. . . [because] the act...
exempts from taxation pro bono legal services and government counsel appointed for
indigents. Because of this exception, the act only taxes those who can afford to retain
counsel and pay the tax.
Because those persons who cannot afford to pay legal fees will pay no tax, the act
does not appear to bar any person from seeking redress for any injury in the courts.
Id. at 302-03 (footnote omitted). In this light, a 5% tax would be only an "incidental burden
upon court access." Id. at 303.
In declining to address a state law equal protection claim, the court noted that "[a] deci-
sion on this claim has little or no adverse fiscal impact on the Governor's functions." Id. at
305. Addressing the argument that the tax on advertising was discriminatory, the court ac-
cepted non-record facts argued by a participant. Stating that:
As the state points out, the taxation of advertising is expected to account for only
4.7% of all revenues derived. . . . The revenues derived from the taxation of adver-
tising services is projected to account for only 1.4% of the total tax revenues derived
from [sales taxes] during the 1987-88 fiscal year. We cannot say that, on its face, this
smacks of discrimination.
Id. In addressing an argument that certain exemptions were arbitrary, the court noted that:
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consider whether useful conclusions can be drawn about an in-
creasing potential for judicial error as the shift is made from using
litigant-developed issues and record facts to derive a result, to us-
ing judge-made hypothetical facts for that purpose."9
When testing the constitutionality of a statute, a court may un-
dertake only one of two courses of action. Both are fact dependent.
A court may adjudicate by looking to record facts to see how an
enactment has been applied and then test those events against
constitutional standards.5 0 Alternatively, a court may consider fa-
cial validity. This analysis involves predicting how an enactment
will be applied and testing the prediction against the standards.
The difference is not between facts and no-facts, but in the kind of
facts employed and the relative confidence one should have in ad-
judicated facts versus hypothetical or predictive facts.5 1 The kind
of facts used in advisory opinions about the facial validity of newly
enacted legislation are no more than projections of reality, state-
"[M]any of the exemptions . . .were enacted in order either to minimize the regressive
nature of tax or to address the specific concerns of organizations that the general taxing
mechanism affected." Id. at 305-06. In addressing whether the state can constitutionally
require those who purchase advertising to identify themselves by registering with a state
entity, the court said that prohibiting the state from doing so "would no doubt result in an
uneven and haphazard enforcement of the tax code." Id. at 306. In addressing an argument
that the media was a selected and, therefore, an invalid target of taxation, the justices con-
cluded that the statutory exemptions are "at the very least, rationally related to the further-
ance of important social policies and, therefore, constitutionally permissible." Id. at 309.
None of these statements can stand without a foundation in fact. The facts asserted by the
court may have been accurate or not, but either way they were not found in any record and
were hypothetical.
49. Again, the fact that questions of the constitutional validity of statutes, like questions
of statutory efficacy, are always questions of fact should be clear. A statute (whether pro-
posed or enacted) may be evaluated in the constitutional sense only for what it does, or may
do, and not for what it says. Like all metaphors, the one that suggests that a statute can be
evaluated "on its face" is misleading. Courts do not pass judgment on statutory esthetics.
50. Record facts identify affected persons and have an operational reality. Facts gener-
ated by the trial process are not simply posited; unlike advisory facts, they do not arise from
the assumptions and experiences of judges. They are stated, specific and smaller. Of course,
the truth that emerges from adjudication is a limited truth. Trial-born facts are developed
within the constraints of the rules of evidence and the interest, knowledge and other limita-
tions of the parties and their counsel. The "whole truth" that the witness is sworn to pro-
vide is not what the witness provides-he or she is permitted only to answer stylized ques-
tions asked by a particular lawyer with a narrow interest. While record facts are designer
facts, the design is to achieve a narrow, contested and fact-specific legal result that will be
subject to review.
51. The advisory process is, in its predictive aspect, suggestive of the remedial compo-
nent of much modern injunctive practice. See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law
Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1281 (1976). The design of remedial injunctions, however, is an
adversarial procedure which can be, and typically is, broadly informed by litigating parties,
independent experts and the like.
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ments of anticipated truth. Analysis of such data is a kind of func-
tional discourse; the product of the analysis is a weak linguistic
construction rather than a natural reality.52
In being anticipatory, both the facts and the results of advisory
proceedings parallel the weaker and tentative qualities of legisla-
tive products. As a threshold matter, legislatures must decide
whether there are public circumstances calling for an enactment.
Likewise, the justices must decide at the advisory threshold
whether there are public circumstances calling for the court's advi-
sory engagement to provide an advisory opinion.53 Once an affirma-
tive threshold decision is made, both bodies must then anticipate
factual consequences. The legislators must determine what kind of
law will have the desired effect on public conduct; the justices
must, in determining validity, predict what public consequences
will flow from the enactment under scrutiny" and then engage in
52. There are at least two other ways in which opinions rendered by advisory courts
have been said to be weak and structurally ill-formed. In normal adjudication, not only the
facts but the issues presented for resolution come to the court after being honed by the
litigation process. In the advisory context, the issues are posited ex parte by an interested
governmental department. As Justice Stevens noted in a similar context: "I believe that the
adversary process functions most effectively when we rely on the initiative of lawyers, rather
than the activism of judges, to fashion the questions for review." New Jersey v. T.L.O., 468
U.S. 1214, 1216 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting from order directing reargument). The bene-
fits of both the litigation honing and normal sequential judicial review are substantial.
Courts at every level have authority to consider the constitutionality of statutes properly
before them.
Normal adjudicatory determination by a highest court is by review of an inferior court
decision. That process of review was clearly distinguished from original consideration as
early as Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174-76 (1803) and is informed by the
reasoning of lower court judges who have previously considered the matter. A request for an
advisory opinion is presented directly and initially to the highest court which then operates,
not as a court of review, but as a court of original jurisdiction: The useful informing
thoughts of lower court judges are not available. Here it is important to remember that
there is hierarchy of courts and not judges. There is no reason to believe that high court
judges are more able than other judges, and none to suggest that the higher court judges
cannot profit from the reasoning of the lower court judiciary.
53. When the justices agree to consider the "facial" validity of a new statute, the justices
agree to compare their factual predictions with those of the legislature. Doing this at the
request of the executive is quite different in its political consequences from doing the same
thing at the request of the legislative branch.
54. Of course, the availability of advisory opinions may encourage other branches to
avoid their own obligation independently to assess the constitutionality of what they do or
to act according to those assessments. Courts should not invite such behavior. It is not un-
known for legislatures to abdicate their duty to act constitutionally in reliance upon even-
tual judicial review. Advisory opinions facilitate this abdication. Legislators and governors
often find the obligation to act constitutionally unpalatable, and an effort may be made to
shift the consequences of acting constitutionally upon others. See Frankfurter, supra note
10, at 1007.
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the common judicial process of testing those consequences against
constitutional standards. Both branches, therefore, engage in much
the same effort. It is only the judiciary that attempts the analysis
without an adequate informing mechanism.
In brief, legislatures employ processed facts while advisory jus-
tices employ unexamined ones. Unlike legislative bodies, advisory
courts are without adequate machinery for gathering and process-
ing the data necessary to determine the need for their participa-
tion; nor do advisory courts have information to predict the conse-
quences they thereafter will evaluate. The legislative process is
public. It operates with staffed committees which gather data from
a range of public sources; legislative proposals are announced, con-
sidered and reconsidered; interested individuals and groups nor-
mally participate in fact gathering and bill drafting. Legal advice is
available. 5 In contrast, the advisory justices operate within a
closed system and cannot independently develop the quality of in-
formation that generates confidence in legislation.
Lacking indicia of confidence, advisory opinions also suffer the
deficiency that, once an opinion is issued, it cannot adequately be
reviewed. Ordinarily, legislators consider a proposed statute based
on their best sense of the need for the statute and on an estimate
of the prospective efficacy of certain measures-a prediction of fu-
ture factual consequences. The act is passed, and then judicial re-
view is eventually available as the system's backup to make neces-
sary corrections. This would occur when the legislature's advice
has been faulty or disregarded or the consequences of an enacted
statute are in practice different from the consequences that were
anticipated. Advisory consideration of statutory validity, coming
The Florida legislature attempted this in the 1987 matter under discussion. One argument
made by opponents challenging the taxing statute was that its exemptions were irrational
and discriminatory. In response, the statute was amended during the advisory proceedings
to provide that, if the court found an exemption to be unlawful, the entire class of exemp-
tions would disappear and all those within the class would be taxed. Thus, had the provision
been judicially invalidated, it would have been the justices who were to be blamed for the
results rather than elected politicians. See generally Briefs of Counsel In re Advisory Opin-
ion to the Governor, 509 So. 2d 292 (1987).
55. Legislatures and governors usually may obtain independent legal advice. The gover-
nor's or legislature's lawyer has a governmental branch for a client, not the governmental
system. An interesting example of the difference this may make was presented by the 1987
Florida matter. In 1979, Justice Alan Sundberg authored a strong dissent from enlarging the
court's advisory jurisdiction because of potential damage to the separation of governmental
powers. See infra note 68. In 1987, while in private practice Sundberg represented the Flor-
ida governor and successfully urged the court to broaden its advisory jurisdiction. See In re
Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 509 So. 2d 292, 297 (Fla. 1987).
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up front, preempts both experience and judicial review. It leaves
the system without a normal review of real consequences. Review
is provided only if an advisory court undertakes to reconsider its
own advice in the context of later adjudication. 6
In responding to the argument that advisory courts are too
poorly informed to arrive at dependable resolutions of serious mat-
ters, some states have provided for participation by interested par-
ties.57 The engagement of interested parties, however, cannot re-
solve the problem of judicial competence, since there is no
mechanism for identifying and notifying those who may be inter-
ested in an enactment. If interested parties could be identified and
encouraged to become involved, such persons would not be permit-
ted to participate in resolving the jurisdictional questions. Further,
their hypothetical arguments on the substantive issues will not
substitute for the well-developed informing processes of adjudica-
tion. Briefing and argument by interested parties adds a dimension
to the advisory justices' data. However, reliance upon that kind of
information will not change the fictional quality of the proceed-
ing.55 While there may be a more full exposition of the possible
operation of an enactment, the facts before the advisory justices
will remain non-adjudicatory, hypothetical and prospective. Thus,
the function of interested parties is only to add an expanded ver-
sion of imagined possibilities and to sharpen the advisory's parody
of reality.5 9
56. Advisory courts always agree to reconsider if a rights-litigant later demonstrates that
the facts were predicted in error. As the Florida justices said recently, "any interested par-
ties are free to initiate lawsuits to . . . argue that this advisory opinion has either been
wrongly decided or that the act is unconstitutional as applied to their particular situations."
In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 509 So. 2d 292, 302 (Fla.'1987) (emphasis added).
Where a statute is found unconstitutional by a high advisory court, lower courts may (but
are demonstrably unlikely to) disregard the advice. The legislature may disregard the opin-
ion, but it is more likely to amend, repeal or perhaps seek constitutional change. These
options effectively preclude later adjudicated review. Where a statute is found facially con-
stitutional by an advisory court, subsequent courts will need to disagree about the facts or
the law, to find to the contrary and risk reversal.
57. The current Florida provision is illustrative: "[T]he justices shall, subject to their
rules of procedure, permit interested persons to be heard on the questions presented ....
FLA. CONsT. art. IV, § 1(c). See also supra note 3.
58. While there are well recognized and perhaps inevitable limitations on the adequacy
of adjudicated facts, there is generally nothing inherently abstract about them. Adjudicated
facts identify events that have affected or at least caught the attention of real persons; they
have an operational reality. Facts produced out of the matrix of trial are not simply posited;
they do not exist merely in the assumptions and suppositions of justices. That record facts
may also be inaccurate, partial, or unclear is a different issue.
59. Felix Frankfurter made a similar complaint in 1924 when he stated: "[H]owever
much provision may be made on paper for adequate arguments (and experience justifies
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The resulting advisory opinion, a hypothetical construct, is then
quite ambiguous with uncertain future implications. Decisions
reached through adjudication are announced in written opinions
which provide other courts and future litigants with a statement of
the underlying real data which governed and which will give force
and value to the particular result. Decisional law formulates legal
rules which thereafter serve as templates for others to order their
affairs. Advisory opinions, however, because they are without re-
ported facts, are little more than announcements of abstract rules.
Like fresh legislation, such opinions await meaning through
application.
In adjudication, the different facts of a new case may result in
application of the same law or the application of a different law
which may lead to a different result. This is how the law is prop-
erly developed. It is this close judicial attention to factual distinc-
tions which avoids the unintended and unjust results of mechani-
cally applying broad enactments. The concept that decisions are
driven by facts lies at the heart of fairness and due process. Care-
ful differential factual analysis is the common work of judges; it is
expected and undertaken by judicial tribunals. It cannot, however,
be engaged in by an advisory court operating with abstract princi-
ples and hypothetical facts.
The careful development of just law, like the guarantee of due
process, lies in the ordered relationship of facts and rules. Further-
more, justice requires that there be operative facts that ultimately
control results. The controlling substance of an advisory opinion,
however, lies not in articulated operative facts, but in law as a pro-
position. Abstract theorizing will construct the facts and theory
will control the result. This is particularly worrisome in the advi-
sory context where opinions tend to bind persons who have had no
voice in the matter.6 ° It would make little difference if advisory
little reliance) advisory opinions are bound to move in an unreal atmosphere." Frankfurter,
supra note 10, at 1006. Arguably, if adequate notice were made available, participation by
interested persons might provide an advisory court with a range of data more broad than is
sometimes available in ordinary litigation between presumably interested parties. Freely
available third-party intervention in any proceeding may carry its own problems, but it may
also increase the amount of useful information before the court. An advisory opinion which
may have a potentially sweeping range could thereby be widely, if abstractly, informed.
60. Due process concerns may be present whenever a person's conduct is directly con-
strained by an order from which he has had no opportunity to be heard. See Laycock, Con-
sent Decrees Without Consent: The Rights of Nonconsenting Third Parties, 1987 U. CHI. L.
FORUM 103. While third persons are often affected with varying degrees of directness by
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opinions were ineffectual, but they are not."'
In sum, adjudicated facts are smaller and more manageable in
that they commonly describe historical incidents limited to time,
place and person. The careful judicial consideration of such data
leads to incremental and, if necessary, distinguishable results. This
contributes to the slow and confident motion of the common law.
Where more sweeping directions are sought, our confidence is per-
haps more appropriately left to a combination of the legislative
process with its superior informing mechanisms and to subsequent
judicial review of real events.
V. COMMINGLING OF POWERS AND DAMAGE TO THE GOVERNMENT
AND COURT
A second general criticism of the advisory process is that it may
unbalance the formal governmental structure and engage, or ap-
pear to engage, the judiciary too directly in politics. This criticism
is most telling when the justices provide advice regarding the con-
stitutionality of new legislation.
All advisory jurisdictions have provisions for the separation of
governmental powers.e2 The justices' power to issue preemptive
what courts do without their participation, this only infrequently presents serious problems.
If the effect is serious, reappraisal is available; the stranger has a right to a clean shot at
different treatment if he presents different operative facts. This safety valve tends to be
absent in the advisory context where a litigant is likely to be ignorant of the operative facts
that gave rise to a particular result. Although no formal res judicata or estoppel will bar
arguing a position contrary to that reached earlier in an advisory opinion, the practical ef-
fect may be comparable. The party who finds his argument effectively pre-empted by an
interposed advisory opinion may not appreciate the benefits of being only informally barred.
These due process considerations should carry weight in an advisory proceeding regarding
the validity of enacted legislation where reliance may be presumed.
61. In the Florida example, the interests of parties already in the trial court were imme-
diately affected. As soon as the high court announced its intention to provide advice to the
governor, the trial court stayed the pending cases. The trial court subsequently announced
that it was bound by the advisory opinion and would hear no argument contrary to that
result. While commentators addressing the issue have found most advisory courts reluctant
to decide matters already being litigated. See Note, Advisory Opinions on the Constitution-
ality of Statutes, 69 HARv. L. REv. 1309 n.40 (1956). The Florida governor's 1987 request for
advice, however, was delivered in an effort to avoid the hazards of pending and threatened
litigation. See In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 509 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 1987).
62. The language of the Florida Constitution is typical: "Branches of Government.-The
powers of the state government shall be divided into legislative, executive and judicial
branches. No person belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers appertaining to ei-
ther of the other branches unless expressly provided herein." FLA. CONST. art. III, § 3; see
also State v. Troise, 526 A.2d 898 (Del. 1987) (interpreting the executive's appointment
power of DEL. CONST. art. III, § 9); ALA. CONST. art III, § 43; COLO. CONsT. art. III; ME. CONST.
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and non-adjudicatory advice to another branch alters the sequence
and extends the range of judicial intrusion into the operation of
other governmental units.63 Therefore, in every jurisdiction, there
are at least theoretical limits imposed upon the scope of that intru-
sion. Where those limits are ignored by courts, the balanced struc-
ture of government is subject to risks greater than those of deci-
sional error and process disorder.
Neither judges nor governors in any jurisdiction are given gen-
eral powers to review legislation. Legislation can be proposed or
vetoed by an executive, 4 and courts may come to review legislation
for validity in the context of adjudication. In every jurisdiction, it
is the elected legislature's sole responsibility to determine the need
for and the design of statutes.65 Thus, only elected legislatures are
empowered to decide, in the first instance, the manner in which
public conduct is to be regulated.66 When an advisory court pro-
vides an executive with unlimited standing to obtain constitutional
assessment of new legislation, the executive branch may employ
the judiciary to supervise the legislative process. Consequently,
where high court justices do not adhere to commanding principles
upon which judicial discretion may be exercised, and have no prin-
art. III; MASS. CONST. pt.1, art. XXX, § 31; MICH. CONST. art. Ill, § 2; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art.
37; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 6; OKLA. CONsT. art. IV, § 1; R.I. CONST. art. V; S.D. CONST. art. II;
VA. CONST. art. III, § 1. The federal constitution does not expressly provide for a separation
of powers. The principle of division into three coordinate branches has, however, been rec-
ognized as inherent in the federal system.
63. A separation of powers affects an insulation of the judiciary. The more general pur-
pose is to avoid abuse by one branch at the expense of the others, while retaining a proper
and necessary interdependence of governmental parts. It is probably not possible to demon-
strate the effect of any particular undertaking on either governmental balance or on the
reputation of a court, nor is it possible to assess either with much confidence.
64. A few states permit the executive the alternative of returning a bill to the legislature
with proposed amendments. See, e.g., V&_ CONsT. art. V, § 6.
65. E.g., FLA. CONsT. art. III, § 1.
66. The Florida example demonstrates how accepting an advisory request may force the
justices into the drafting process itself. Then, once the court agreed to render its opinion,
the Florida legislature remained in session until after the opponents' briefs were filed. The
statute the court agreed to consider was then amended to deal with issues "smoked out" in
the opponents' briefs.
After the challengers' briefs were fied arguing that certain statutory exemptions were
discriminatory and before the justices decided the matter, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 212.0591(10)
was amended by chapter 87-72 to provide that if any tax exemption were to be struck down
for facial invalidity, the entire exemption would be eliminated. The legislature's responding
advisory brief then announced: "If the opponents were to convince the Court of their dis-
crimination argument, they would thereby achieve the elimination of the exemptions
granted to churches and charities." Brief for the Legislature at 50, In re Advisory Opinion
to the Governor, 509 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 1987).
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cipled basis for declining to respond, the justices may lose their
independence and become subservient to the requesting branch.
Advisory opinions, regarding the constitutionality of emergent
statutes, are quite different from opinions regarding other subjects
where non-case analysis may be advisable.6 7 There has been little
effort, even by dissenting advisory justices, to identify the values
protected by a separation of powers. Undoubtedly the continued
independence and consequent authority of the judicial branch is
among them. 8 This interest which is largely ignored by advisory
courts, seems directly vulnerable to damage from non-case resolu-
tion of constitutional issues.
Recognizing that court mandates are ultimately obeyed only be-
cause they should be obeyed,69 the federal and state judiciary have
expended considerable energy in developing techniques to insulate
67. Advisory intervention to resolve some intra-governmental claims to allocated power
may be preferable to adjudication. Resolution of problems of authority allocation between
public entities will only rarely have a direct effect on the private rights of individuals, and it
is sometimes difficult for public bodies to position such issues for resolution through adjudi-
cation. E.g., In re Advisory Opinion of the Governor Civil Rights, 306 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 1975)
(question whether the governor's exclusive constitutional power to grant clemency was in-
fringed by a statute; acceptance of advisory jurisdiction rested in part on recognition that
the intra-governmental issue would be difficult to reach through normal adjudication).
68. Dissenting opinions have expressed concern at the erosion of constitutionally man-
dated separation of powers effected by expanded advisory jurisdiction. An articulate expres-
sion is found in the dissent of Justice Sundberg:
My reluctance to render such advice does not stem from a formalistic or technical
posture, but from a real concern for the appropriate role to be exercised by the coor-
dinate branches of government. A proper regard for the separation of powers among
the branches of government indicates that the solemn responsibility of passing on the
constitutional validity of legislative and executive acts should be exercised within the
traditional adversary context.
I am more mindful, however, of the serious erosion to our system of separation of
powers which I perceive will result from indiscriminately passing upon the constitu-
tional validity of executive and legislative acts through the vehicle of an advisory
opinion.
In re Advisory Opinion, 374 So. 2d 959, 971-72 (Fla. 1979).
69. While the mandates of a court are to be obeyed by or enforced against the litigating
parties whether private or public, it is less obvious that governmental entities are bound to
accept a court's constitutional views. Both the executive and legislative branches have at
least an arguable right to constitutional interpretations not in conformity with those of the
judiciary. As Professor Tribe demonstrates in discussing Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S.
641 (1966), such a variety of conflicting interpretations will be ultimately unsatisfactory. L.
TRiBE, supra note 45, at 28-29; see also Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974
Term-Forward: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1975) (acceptance of the
judicial interpretation, at least where federal-state relations are not implicated, is ultimately
a matter of political accommodation).
19891 ADVISORY OPINIONS
courts and to limit the occasions for judicial intervention. Fore-
most among these structural restraints is the posture of courts as
reactive institutions. The advisory process, in its tendency both to
increase and to politicize constitutional decision making, and to
paint the judiciary as playing an active (or overly cooperative) role,
runs counter to these useful efforts.70
Non-case advice of high court justices is often sought to resolve
problems of another branch, including problems of intra-govern-
mental distribution of powers. Such questions are almost always
highly political;7 1 therefore, unless the justices carefully shape and
then express a sensitivity to the parameters of their own authority,
later advice regarding the limits imposed by them upon other
branches may carry little weight.72 Participation by courts in the
allocation of governmental power may be inevitable, but it also
risks an appearance of an active political engagement that may be
perceived as contrary to the work of an independent judiciary.73
This risk is greater when the participation is invited. The percep-
tion of judicial dependence is not likely changed by the assertion
that advisory opinions are different because they are non-judicial
and therefore may be ignored. Courts cannot excuse what will be
70. The infrequency of constitutional decision making probably supports its acceptance.
When rights litigation is the only avenue to constitutional assessment, the availability of
constitutional determinations is limited. As both private and public persons are required to
show a direct and concrete interest in the circumstances to receive judicial consideration,
some issues are difficult to present in a timely manner or at all. Thus, the increased use of
short cuts such as advisory opinions is encouraged. While principles of inter alia, standing,
injury in fact, and a disinclination to decide avoidable issues limit access and are cited in
support of advisory intervention; the use of declaratory judgments, changing concepts of
inter alia, third-party standing, representative party standing and the changing views of
"political" questions as in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) have already greatly broadened
access to constitutional adjudication.
71. American courts are not prohibited from deciding properly presented "political" is-
sues. "There is hardly a political question in the United States which does not sooner or
later turn into a judicial one." ALFmS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERIcA 270 (J.
Mayer ed. 1969).
72. Where under the enabling language advice is sought to resolve "urgent" governmen-
tal problems and particularly where advisory jurisdiction is exercised regarding "solemn" or
"important" matters, a court's threshold decision whether to provide advice will appear as
an agreement with the requesting authority's characterization of the political circumstances.
See supra note 3.
73. Justice Stevens recently pointed out the potential damage to the Court of not await-
ing litigant-presented issues. Such participation, Stevens noted, "must also have a detrimen-
tal and enduring impact on the public's perception of the Court as an impartial adjudicator
of cases and controversies brought to us for decision by lawyers representing adverse inter-
ests in contested litigation." Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 108 S. Ct. 1419, 1423 (1988)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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perceived as inappropriate judicial behavior by asserting that what
they do may be disregarded.
Justices may describe advisory opinions as non-judicial, non-in-
stitutional and non-binding;74 but the evidence is plain that advi-
sory opinions become binding abstractions, the effect of which can
be neither predicted nor controlled. Commentators who have ad-
dressed the issue agree that advisory opinions, once rendered, have
power not unlike ordinary judicial opinions.7 5 While the substan-
tive issues addressed may disappear with changing political cir-
cumstances, the structural effects of advisory opinions tend to
persist.
Judges are charged not only with intervening upon the default of
the more populist branches but with proceeding in a manner that
is supportive of their continued authority to do so. Support for the
exercise of their extraordinary governmental power has tradition-
ally been strengthened by the infrequency and the restriction of
the court's exercise of power within the confines of adversary liti-
gation. The public perception of a politically inert and impartial
judiciary doing its work on behalf of important legal values may
well be necessary to the legitimate exercise of judicial power. 6
Voluntary compliance with any form of judicial intervention may
be made more unlikely when a court loses its reputation as a neu-
tral body.7 When courts appear to confuse law and politics by is-
suing hypothetical declarations of constitutionality, there is little
reason for other governmental branches, competent to make their
own political judgments (and equally obligated to act constitution-
74. See supra note 39.
75. Field's survey found that advisory opinions had precedential value fully equal to that
of adjudicated opinions. See Field, supra note 10; see also Comment, Advisory Opinions on
the Constitutionality of Statutes, 69 HARV. L. REv. 1302, 1304 (1956) (reaching the same
conclusion).
76. Litigants' compliance with constitutional decisions is not different from litigants'
compliance with other kinds of judicial decisions. Insofar as constitutional adjudication is a
normal judicial undertaking to resolve rights, the question of compliance by the parties does
not arise. Decisions that are the necessary by-products of rights adjudication are binding on
the parties and fully enforceable. But, many constitutional decisions are different and tend
to have a broader impact on governmental behavior. The extent to which others, including
governments, may willingly follow these results may be related to the extent a court is per-
ceived as engaging in normal adjudication rather than announcing the component parts of
good government.
77. A politically acceptable reason that a court may confidentially rule that the governor
may not enact laws is, for example, not that it is bad government, but that it is unlawful.
While the moral authority of a "non-political" court can enforce that result, a political en-
tity is properly to be argued with.
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ally), to accept the court's advice .7  Further, to the extent any gov-
ernmental branch is free to obtain the justices' advice on demand
and to ignore it at will, the court's work may seem damagingly ir-
relevant.7 9 Public disregard for what a court says may well be con-
tagious. If the chief executive may ignore the justices' advice,80
why should any private citizen obey the words of the same
judges?8 '
Thus, the peculiar role and exposed posture of courts carries
with it a principal responsibility to husband rather than squander
judicial authority-to maintain legitimacy over the long
pull-whatever the political currents that affect other more "politi-
cal" branches. On-demand production of constitutional opinions is
foreign to that charge and to that history. The tendency is to
spend a court's moral authority. There may be occasions when ex-
penditure of a court's authority must be made, but this should be
resisted, not invited. Historically, when courts have been called
upon to assert authority over another department, caution and
clarity of role, purpose, and expression have been exercised. Those
values are rarely considered in the advisory context.
78. The fact that litigating parties (private or public) are bound by the final mandates of
adjudication is more obvious than that other governmental branches are bound by the con-
stitutional directions of a court. While courts function as final arbiters of a constitutional
text, they do not do so by any clear mandate. Acquiescence by non-parties is more a conse-
quence of accepted and necessary political practice.
79. The political value of some delay between passage and judgment is obvious. That is,
before being tested by litigation, an otherwise new statute will not only have been seasoned
by use which will provide a real factual context, but will provide a useful space between
enactment and judgment which may lessen the public perception that a court, expected only
to determine legal validity, is instead making policy. When a resulting judgment is likely to
be unpopular, the advantage of casting the policy burden on the justices is not likely to be
lost on governors or legislators. Bickel made a similar reference in discussing the lag be-
tween legislation and judicial review in the federal system necessitated by the requirement
that a factual dispute arise before adjudication can be undertaken. A BicKEL, THE LEAsT
DANGEROUS BRANCH, 116 (1962).
80. State legislators and executives are bound to act constitutionally. Enacted legislation
carries a presumption of constitutionality. The presumption is that the legislature has,
through its informing mechanisms, found facts to make the operation of its enactments con-
stitutional and that the executive has concurred. Legislative and executive adherence to
constitutional standards benefits the judiciary by reducing the need for judicial intervention
to those few cases where other branches have inaccurately predicted future operation of an
enactment, or where another branch misconceives or purposefully defaults in its constitu-
tional duty.
81. It is probably flattering to be asked for advice on matters of state. However, after
giving their counsel and placing their imprimatur on, or denying legitimacy to, legislation,
the justices may only watch as other branches accept their invitation to ignore what the
justices have said. Thus, the justices risk becoming politically impotent whenever they ap-
pear politically engaged.
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VI. CONCLUSION
When invited to give an advisory opinion, the high court is
presented with an unusual opportunity. Resolution of the decision
to proceed or to decline, and the court's articulation of that result,
may serve to either reinforce or to weaken a number of civic values
including the public perception of the court's own independent ju-
dicial role. While the advantages of providing abstract legal advice
to another branch of government are frequently seen as problem-
atic, the values of an independent judiciary are not debatable.
Those values are reinforced whenever the justices assert their inde-
pendence. Thus, courts should stay their hands in the absence of a
clear, present and articulable need.
The advisory process has some limited value in the resolution of
intra-governmental problems in clarification of ambiguous consti-
tutional terms and in the solution of some urgent problems not
easily presented for adjudication. Standards should be developed
to permit courts to restrict the process within those parameters.
The substantial informational weaknesses of preemptive interven-
tion should be acknowledged. There is a need for renewed recogni-
tion that non-case decision making has a potential for disrupting
the constitutionally mandated allocation of governmental powers.
Its potential for inflicting damage on the authority of courts also
needs reassessment. While the informational deficiencies of non-
case advice are subject to some alleviation through the encourage-
ment of participation by interested parties, damage to the govern-
mental structure can be avoided only by a careful and principled
exercise of judicial discretion to determine which matters are prop-
erly subject to non-case analysis.
Even when the call to intervene seems most urgent, courts
should consider whether their advisory and adjudicatory roles are
compatible and assess the benefits of deferral for adjudication. In
determining jurisdiction, courts should be able to articulate and
employ standards grounded in well-accepted principles of govern-
ment. Further, a court should take the time to assess the effect of
exercising advisory jurisdiction on the rights and expectations of
unknown individuals and on pending litigation.
Judicial discharge of the obligations to maintain a proper bal-
ance of governmental power and to reinforce judicial authority,
like judicial supervision of the constitutionality of government be-
havior, is a sensitive and difficult task. When implicated together
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in a matter initiated by the claim of political necessity of a coordi-
nate branch, courts would be wise to exercise more caution and to
articulate its purposes with more clarity.

